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This year Steve Darwall and I, with substantial financial support from the Advanced Study 
Center of the International Institute here at the University of Michigan, and from the Pew 
Charitable Trusts, will conduct a year-long seminar on "Theories and Practices of Religious 
Toleration/Intolerance." 
 
Our interest in this topic arises from our common concern with the history of moral and political 
philosophy in the early modern period, and our recognition that between the 16th and 18th 
Centuries a remarkable change took place. In the 16th Century the major religious denominations 
in Europe regarded toleration of their rivals as at best a necessary evil, which might be forced 
upon them by political circumstances, but was not desirable in itself. By the end of the 18th 
Century some form of religious liberty had come to be regarded as an essential ingredient in 
documents like the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the American Bill 
of Rights. 
 
This is an historical development on which much has been built. E.g., Rawls ascribes the origin 
of political liberalism, and of liberalism generally, and "the rise of the modern understanding of 
liberty of conscience and freedom of thought," to "the Reformation and its aftermath... the long 
controversies over religious toleration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries."1 
 
We would like to know how this change came about, and to what extent philosophical 
arguments, whose principles we might still be willing to endorse, may have played a role in the 
change. Toleration is, after all, a problematic ideal. It requires majorities to permit beliefs and 
practice of which they may profoundly disapprove, even when they take their disapproval to be 
thoroughly justified. How can this be a political value in a democratic society, much less the 
cornerstone of political justice? 
 
Is the best defense of this value skepticism about the possibility of attaining religious truth? 
Depending on the epistemological commitments of the majority religion and the degree of 
skepticism proposed, that might easily be construed as an attack on that religion itself, and not 
merely on its imposition on dissenters. 
 
Or does the best defense make an appeal to the value of autonomy, conceived as requiring the 
ability to rationally assess, and perhaps revise, even our deepest beliefs and values? That will be 
unconvincing to those who do not share the liberal concern with autonomy, who may regard 
commitment to certain beliefs and values as more important than being open to the endless 
possibility of revising their views. 
 
Perhaps it is a symptom of our inability, up to now at least, to find a uniformly satisfactory 
rationale for religious toleration that we continually face difficult problems about defining the 
limits of its proper application. It makes a good political slogan to say - as William Popple did in 
the preface to his translation of Locke's first Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) - "Absolute 
liberty, true and just liberty, equal and impartial liberty, is the thing that we stand in need of."2 
But Locke himself thought the proposition that no government could permit absolute liberty was, 
like the truths of mathematics, one we could be demonstratively certain of. (Essay, IV, iii, 18) 
In the United States questions about how we are to reconcile our commitment to toleration with 
our other commitments most commonly take the form of Supreme Court cases requiring 
decisions about what the First Amendment means when it prohibits the establishment of religion 
and guarantees its free exercise. E.g., in the 19th Century, the Court ruled that the free exercise 
clause did not protect the Mormon practice of polygamy, holding that though the government has 
no constitutional authority to punish religious beliefs, it does have the authority to regulate 
religiously motivated actions, so long as it has a rational basis for doing so.3 
 
The leading cases on the free exercise clause a generation ago adopted a much broader 
interpretation: that the government could not substantially burden a religious practice, unless it 
could show a compelling government interest, and was using the least intrusive means possible.4 
It's unclear how Mormon polygamy would have fared under that test. But in 1990, in a case 
involving the use of peyote by members of the Native American Church,5 the Court narrowed 
the scope of the free exercise clause, holding that the balancing required by the Sherbert and 
Yoder decisions was not necessary, that neutral, generally applicable laws could restrict religious 
practices even when not supported by a compelling government interest. Those who have 
followed the career of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which attempted to 
reinstate the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine, will recall that this summer the Court struck down that act 
as an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to override the Court's authority to interpret the 
Constitution.6 
 
In the United States the religion claiming the most adherents is Christianity, which has its own 
history of having been both the victim and the perpetrator of religious intolerance, and its own 
intellectual resources for dealing with this issue. The advocates of both toleration and intolerance 
have appealed to those resources in support of their causes.7 Often it is a weakness of the classic 
arguments for toleration, including some of those found in Locke's famous Letter, that they are 
essentially arguments ad hominem, addressed to a Christian opponent who may well have a very 
different interpretation of the requirements of his religion. In any event, such arguments do not 
seem in the spirit of modern liberalism, which typically requires that justifications offered in the 
public forum be such as all citizens might reasonably be expected to endorse as reasonable and 
rational, and hence that they not depend on particular religious commitments.8 
 
In this last decade of the 20th Century it no longer seems possible to consider the question of 
religious toleration simply as a problem within western philosophy or the legal systems of 
western democracies, though this has typically been the approach of western philosophers. In 
seeking a justification for religious toleration which does not appeal to the moral and religious 
convictions of a particular religious tradition, it seems reasonable to ask: how are these issues 
dealt with in other cultures? 
 
In western democracies religious liberty is most often thought of as a right which individuals 
have against the government. But in nonwestern cultures religious liberty is quite commonly 
thought of as a right which groups have against the government, where the rights of these groups 
may be understood to imply a measure of control over their members which would be 
inconsistent with religious liberty as western cultures tend to conceive it.9 Westerners may 
naturally prefer a conception of religious liberty more oriented toward individual rights, but it is 
not clear that they can do so without undermining the religions they profess to tolerate. A 
religious community's control over its members - over their education, dress, participation in the 
life of the religious community, and contacts with the broader community - may be essential to 
its continued existence.10 
 
Again, and particularly in the United States, it is common to think of religious liberty as 
requiring a separation of church and state. But quite apart from the notorious difficulties of 
defining the proper spheres of church and state, the very assumption that the state has its own 
separate sphere of legitimate activity implies that a secular justification of that activity is 
possible. To say this is to take a controversial position within religion, not to remain 'above the 
fray.' And this way of conceiving the issue may also be inappropriate in cultural contexts where 
one or more of the relevant religions may not be organized into churches in the ways we are 
familiar with. 
 
Philosophers trained in the traditions of western philosophy are often dissenters from the religion 
dominant in their culture, and as such, beneficiaries of the toleration their culture practices. So it 
is perhaps natural for them to think of toleration as generally a good thing, and to think of the 
problem of toleration as one of explaining, in a way which might prove convincing to those who 
disagree, why it is a good thing (when it is), and what its proper limits are. 
 
A broader perspective may raise doubts. It's clear, for example, that the motives for practicing 
religious toleration are not always benign. It may be a tool by which an imperialist power divides 
and conquers a subject people. And the insistence on this value, in preference to others with 
which it comes into competition, may reflect an insufficient sensitivity to the interests of those 
who are 'other' in a different sense. For example, to what extent do differences of race and gender 
explain what Michael Walzer has called "the extraordinary reluctance"11 of the British in India 
to ban the practice whereby Hindu widows committed suicide on their husbands' funeral pyres? 
Or the resistance of our own courts to those seeking asylum from clitoridectomy? 
 
The end of colonialism has not made such problems significantly easier. Indeed, decolonization 
has often been accompanied by large scale migration of formerly colonized peoples to the 
countries which had previously been colonial powers. This has led to bitter debates about the 
limits of tolerance in civil society, a restaging within the immigrant society of what had been 
colonial conflicts. 
 
To pursue the kind of inquiry we wish to engage in - one which is concerned with both the 
various theories and the various practices of religious toleration and intolerance - requires a 
perspective which is both multidisciplinary and multicultural. So our first step was to involve 
three of our colleagues in the planning of the seminar: Donald Regan (Philosophy/Law), Juan 
Cole (History/Middle Eastern and North African Studies), and Luis Gomez (Asian Languages 
and Cultures). When funding was approved, we had at our disposal a combination of pre- and 
post-doctoral fellowships, supplemented by the Institute's Distinguished Visiting Speakers 
program. With these resources we have been able to invite to campus scholars from the fields, 
not only of philosophy, but also of history, political science, law, sociology, anthropology, and 




Islamic Theology, University of Paris III; author of Rethinking Islam 
 
Naim Ateek 




Law School, Columbia University, Private Consciences and Public Reasons 
 
Martin Marty 
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Academy of Arts and Sciences 
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Political Science, Arizona, Difference and Dissent 
 
David Nirenberg 
History, Rice, Communities of Violence 
 
Martha Nussbaum 
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We are also supporting the work of Ph.D. students already on campus in several of those areas, 
including one student from philosophy, Craig Duncan. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Such is the general project. My own contribution to it involves trying to place Spinoza within the 
history of discussion on this topic. For some years now the primary focus of my research has 
been on a translation of the complete works of Spinoza. Vol. I, whose centerpiece was the Ethics, 
appeared in 1985. Now I'm working on Vol. II, whose centerpiece will be the Theological-
Political Treatise. A landmark in the history of biblical criticism, this treatise is also the first 
work by a major philosopher in the western tradition to argue for religious toleration. Published 
in 1670, it antedates Locke's first Letter on Toleration by 19 years. 
At this point my history of thought about religious toleration in early modern philosophy begins 
with Sebastian Castellio's On Heretics: Whether they are to be persecuted, and in general, how 
they are to be treated (1554).12 Castellio is an interesting figure, though his name is now better 
known to Reformation historians than to philosophers. He was prompted to write his book by the 
burning, in 1553, of Michael Servetus, who had been incautious enough to defend unorthodox 
opinions about the doctrine of the Trinity.13 
 
Servetus was originally a Spaniard, who had imbibed the spirit of Erasmian liberalism in the 
court of Charles V. Erasmus emphasized the ethical aspects of Christianity at the expense of the 
doctrinal, and taught that Christians could suspend judgment on many theological issues, 
including those relating to the Trinity. The faith actually required for salvation was a simple one: 
"cultivate the fruits of the Spirit, which are love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, long-
suffering, mercy, faith, modesty, continence, and chastity."14 Servetus became convinced that 
the doctrine of the Trinity was a great obstacle to the conversion of Jews and Muslims, and an 
unnecessary one, since the scriptural evidence for it was weak, and rational theology had 
difficulty making sense of it. 
 
In 1531 Servetus published a book defending these views. Subsequently he attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to persuade both Catholic theologians and the leaders of the new reformed 
churches of their soundness. In 1553 Calvin, with whom he had been in correspondence, 
provided the Inquisition with information which led to his arrest in Lyons. Servetus showed 
boldness and ingenuity in escaping from the Inquisition, but then foolishly went to Geneva, 
where he was recognized, arrested, tried, convicted and burned at the stake, after having been 
denied his request for a swifter death by the sword. (He was afraid that in the anguish of being 
burned he might recant and lose his soul.) 
 
Castellio, like Calvin, was a French Protestant, living in Switzerland as a refugee from Catholic 
persecution in France. In his teens he had received a humanist education, and had been deeply 
impressed by Luther's words at the Diet of Worms: "Everyone believes at his own risk... 
Conscience must not be submitted to anyone."15 On leaving France in 1540 he had gone first to 
Strassburg, where he lodged with Calvin, then an exile from Geneva. When Calvin was recalled 
to Geneva, he took Castellio with him, and arranged for him to become the head of an academy 
there. Castellio wanted to become a minister in Geneva, but was rejected by the Council because 
he developed disagreements with Calvin.16 He left Geneva for Basel, where, after years of 
working at jobs well below his qualifications, he eventually became a teacher of classics at the 
University. 
 
Concerning Heretics is a curious work. Much of it is not Castellio's own words, but extended 
quotation from the works of others who had written in favor of toleration, including a number of 
authors who were certainly not consistent advocates of toleration. Augustine is an interesting and 
influential case. In one of his letters he writes: 
 
I was formerly of the opinion that no one should be forced to the unity of Christ, that we should 
agitate with the word, fight with disputation, conquer by reason, lest we substitute feigned 
Catholics for avowed heretics. This opinion of mine was changed, not by the words of critics, but 
by the logic of events. My own town rose up to convict me. It had been entirely devoted to the 
Donatist party, but now was brought to Catholic unity by fear of the imperial laws.17 
 
Understandably, this was not one of the Augustinian texts Castellio quoted. But even after 
Augustine changed his mind about the legitimacy of using force to achieve uniformity, he did 
write words liberals could use, at least in criticism of the treatment of Servetus. Augustine seems 
to have always felt uncomfortable about executing heretics; in several of the passages Castellio 
cites the main point is to forbid excessive punishment, not to forbid all punishment. 
 
Even in Augustine's later writings, Castellio is able to find a congenial interpretation of the 
parable of the weeds in the wheat. This text (Matt. 13:24-30) comes up repeatedly in the 
toleration debate. In it Jesus tells of a householder whose servants report that there are weeds 
growing among his wheat. When the servants ask whether they should pull up the weeds, the 
householder instructs them not to, lest they inadvertently pull up wheat along with the weeds; 
they should leave the weeds for the reapers who will come at harvest time. Asked by his 
disciples for an interpretation of this parable, Jesus identifies the good seed with the children of 
the kingdom, the weeds with the children of "the evil one," the reapers with angels, and the 
harvest with "the end of the age." (Matt. 13:37-43) 
 
Castellio quotes a passage from Augustine in which he concludes from this parable that 
responsibility for collecting the weeds to be burned belongs to another [i.e., the angels], and that 
"no son of the Church should think it his business."(Bainton, p. 208) But Augustine himself 
sometimes read the parable in a less liberal way. Elsewhere, pointing out that the reason the 
householder gives for not instructing the servants to gather the weeds is the danger of pulling up 
wheat with the weeds, Augustine argues that where this danger does not exist (i.e., where it is 
quite clear which is wheat and which is weed), then "severe discipline must not remain dormant." 
18 
 
Castellio treats Luther equally selectively. He quotes a passage from the earlier, more tolerant 
Luther, which interprets the parable of the weeds as excluding the use of force (Bainton, pp. 153-
4), and he passes over in discreet silence later passages in which Luther found a way to render 
that parable consistent with the repression of sectaries who denied the Apostles' Creed. (Bainton, 
p. 48) Castellio quotes extensively from Luther's treatise On Secular Authority, prompted by the 
Duke of Saxony's attempt to prohibit distribution of Luther's translation of the New Testament. 
There Luther takes a strict line about the limits of secular powers, holding that they extend only 
to bodies and goods on earth.19 Only God has jurisdiction over men's souls, since only he has 
the knowledge of men's souls which would permit him to judge whether or not they are 
complying with his command: "Every man should be allowed to believe as he will and can, and 
no one should be constrained."20 Understandably Castellio does not quote from texts where 
Luther takes a more expansive view of secular power, as when he urges the German nobility to 
reform the Church, or agrees with Melanchthon that the Anabaptist rejection of the ministerial 
office is a blasphemy punishable by death.21 
 
This, incidentally, is one area in which Rawls' historiography is open to criticism. He writes that 
"Luther and Calvin were as dogmatic and intolerant as the Roman Church had been."22 That 
may be fair as far as Calvin is concerned,23 but it does not apply to the early Luther. One of the 
errors Leo X condemned, when he excommunicated Luther in 1520, was the view that "the 
burning of heretics is contrary to the will of the Holy Spirit." 24 
 
A good deal of Castellio's book is either an appeal to the authority of various religious leaders or 
a kind of argument ad hominem, which tries to use, against those who would justify the 
persecution of heretics, their own words on other occasions. Sometimes, however, Castellio does 
argue in his own person,25 and in a very Erasmian spirit, contending that obedience to the law is 
sufficient for salvation, and that it is not necessary to have correct beliefs on any of the disputed 
theological issues of the day (suchŠas the doctrine of the Trinity, or the Eucharist, or infant 
baptism, or predestination). 
 
Whatever the actual effect of this argument may have been, it ought not to convince any 
reformer who knows his position: it puts too much emphasis on works, and no emphasis at all on 
faith; and it presupposes an affirmative answer to the theological question of free will, assuming 
that even after the fall man does have the power to make his conduct conform to God's will.26 
 
One reason Castellio puts the emphasis he does on works, as opposed to faith, is that he thinks it 
possible to reach agreement about what conduct deserves punishment, but not possible to reach 
agreement about what theological positions might be erroneous enough to deserve punishment. 
He suggests that there is one theological truth evident enough to produce universal agreement: 
that there is one and only one God. (p. 132) But all the other theological doctrines which divide 
the various Christian sects from one another - and even those which divide Turks, Jews and 
Christians from one another - all these matters, it seems, are obscure, otherwise disagreement 
would not persist. Turks, Jews and Christians all agree in worshipping the same God; the 
doctrines which divide them have mainly to do with the person of Christ. These are evidently 
just the kind of theological disputes about which it is not necessary for us to have correct 
opinions. 
 
So Castellio's emphasis on practice over theology is based on what may seem a fairly radical 
skepticism about the possibility of knowing theological truth. A Christian might reasonably ask 
what is left of Christianity, when all its distinctive doctrines are declared unnecessary for 
salvation. Indeed, this was the reaction of Theodore Beza, Calvin's successor in Geneva. In a 
letter to Bullinger he wrote: 
 
If it is necessary to endure the vomit this impious man has spewed in his preface, what remains 
intact to us in the Christian religion? In his eyes, the teaching concerning Christ's mission, on the 
Trinity, on the Eucharist, on baptism, on justification, on free will, and on the state of souls after 
death, is useless - or at least, it is not indispensable to salvation. Even the Jews and the Turks 
believe in God... You see where this is leading: once Scripture is deprived of all authority, we 
would have nothing more to do but to pass into pharisaism; we would become the plaything of 
the papists and the Turks.27 
 
In Castellio's day many Christians feared, with some reason, that the expansion of the Ottoman 
Empire might lead to an Islamic Europe. It is not clear that Castellio's position would permit him 
to object to that possibility. 
One question which inevitably arises in this discussion is how we are to define "heresy." 
Castellio first suggests that if we followed the ordinary usage of the term, we would have to 
regard it as incurably subjective: 
 
we regard those as heretics with whom we disagree. This is evident from the fact that today there 
is scarcely one of our innumerable sects which does not look upon the rest as heretics, so that if 
you are orthodox in one city or region, you are held for a heretic in the next. (Bainton, p. 129) 
 
This is reminiscent of words Montaigne was to write a few years later, and clearly represents an 
unworkable situation. 
 
But Castellio recognizes that his opponents might think they should follow, not ordinary usage, 
which merely reflects the opinions of the common man, but the Word of God. So the question 
becomes: how is the term "heretic" (i.e., the Greek hairetikos) used in Scripture? Castellio points 
out, correctly, if somewhat misleadingly, that "heretic" occurs only once in Scripture, and there 
in a context which suggests, happily enough, that heretics should be treated fairly mildly. In 
Titus 3:10-11 the penalty envisaged for heresy is nothing worse than excommunication, i.e. 
exclusion from the community of believers. 
 
Why is this misleading? Although hairetikos occurs only in Titus, the related term hairesis does 
occur in a vigorous denunciation of heresies in 2 Peter 2:1-22, which suggests that ultimately 
heretics are to receive awesome punishment in the afterlife.28 Those who would punish heretics 
in this life might easily think that anything they could do would pale by comparison with what 
God intended to do. Castellio's idea is that torturing heretics, and inflicting painful deaths on 
them, is incompatible with the love and forgiveness which Christ preached and practiced, and 
which God must be presumed to favor. But it is very difficult to reconcile Castellio's emphasis 
on love and forgiveness with the doctrine of post mortem punishment for sinners implicit in 
scriptural passages like Mark 9:42-43. 
 
A fundamental issue here is that of the ethical requirements of Christianity. The Sermon on the 
Mount has sometimes encouraged Christians to think that the use of force is never permissible, 
and hence to adopt some form of pacifism. Taken strictly and universally, the injunctions to turn 
the other cheek, and not to resist evil, make the whole idea of political authority problematic. 
When some Anabaptists did take these injunctions strictly and universally in the 16th Century, 
they raised the question whether a Christian state can legitimately use violence for any purpose. 
Since it is essential to the state to organize the use of force for the common good, they also raised 
the question whether a Christian state is not a contradiction in terms. 
 
Castellio is anxious to show that he accepts the legitimacy of the state, and its use of force, so 
long as it does not venture into questions of religious belief. So after saying that "the true arms... 
of the Christian religion" are learning, patience, modesty, diligence and clemency, he adds: 
 
This I say only with regard to religion; for when it comes to crimes, murder, adultery, theft, false 
witness, and the like, which God has commanded to be punished, and for which he has 
prescribed the penalty, these are not called into controversy. God has spoken on these matters 
without obscurity and they pertain to the defense of the good, unless we wish to have our throats 
cut in our beds, so depraved are the times. Nor is there any danger that the magistrate, who is 
ordained of God for the defense of the good, should, in hanging a murderer, put to death a good 
man. No one ever yet defended murder, not even the murderer. But the case of religion and of 
the knowledge of Sacred ScriptureŠ is altogether different, for the things contained in it are given 
obscurely and often in enigmas and inscrutable questions, which have been in dispute for more 
than a thousand years without any agreement... (Bainton, p. 215) 
 
This seems much too easy a justification of political authority. Surely there is often a real danger 
that the state may, in attempting to punish murder, put to death a good man. They may punish a 
man who did not actually do what he is being punished for (where that act is unequivocally a 
crime). Moreover, the question whether a particular homicide is justifiable can lead to disputes as 
interminable as any question of theology. (No one defends murder, because by definition murder 
is unjustifiable homicide.) So the state may punish a man who unequivocally did the deed for 
which his being punished, but that act may not be unequivocally a crime. The two ways in which 
the state, in attempting to punish murder, can kill a good man, parallel the ways in which the 
state, in attempting to punish heresy, can kill a good man. 
 
We run the risk that the state will occasionally do this, because it seems to us necessary for the 
common good, so that citizens may rest safe in their beds.29 The defender of religious 
persecution might well ask whether the eternal salvation of its citizens is not a good at least as 
important as their security in this life, and whether it is not worth taking the risk of punishing an 
occasional good man to attain that good. One of the central points in Locke's case against 
religious persecution is that a saving faith cannot be coerced. But those who favor the burning of 
heretics may not be that concerned about saving the heretic's soul. They may be much more 
concerned about stopping him from spreading unbelief to those who are not yet heretics.30 
 
The persecutors whom Castellio was principally addressing seem in fact to have had an 
unwarranted confidence in their ability to decide what a Christian must believe. But though it no 
doubt helps make the decision easier psychologically, it is not clear thatŠ a persecutor must be 
certain of his ability to distinguish theological truth from error for his persecution to be rational. 
Suppose the persecutor thinks it (not certain, but) just highly probable that heŠ is right. And 
suppose he also attaches enormous disutility to the prospect that the person he takes to be a 
heretic will lead others astray. He might reason, in the manner of Pascal wagering on God's 
existence, that it is not worth taking any chances. 
 
Let us suppose that there are only two options: either the persecutor is right or the tolerationist is 
right. The persecutor holds that if we do not have the right theological beliefs, we will go to hell. 
If we do hold the right beliefs, we will go to heaven. The (Castellian) tolerationist holds that no 
controversial member of this set of theological beliefs is essential to salvation, that our salvation 
depends essentially on right conduct (plus, perhaps, whatever theological beliefs are evident 
enough to escape controversy). 
 
Suppose further that the persecutor is right, that those beliefs are essential to (and sufficient for) 
salvation. If the persecutor were to permit the tolerationist to encourage doubts about the 
essential beliefs, and if, in consequence, the tolerationist were successful in spreading doubt 
about those essential truths, then the persecutor would have been indirectly responsible for the 
eternal torment of all those whom the tolerationist persuades to doubt. That is an awesome 
responsibility. 
 
On the other hand, if the tolerationist is right, permitting him to spread doubt to others may still 
adversely affect their salvation. That will now depend mainly on their conduct. Let us not 
introduce here the doctrine of original sin. Let us simply look around us, and ask how many of 
the people whose conduct we can observe would get to heaven if salvation required a high 
degree of conformity with the prescriptions of the Sermon on the Mount. 
 
Still, if they had sufficient respect for Christ, i.e., if they held those controversial beliefs about 
his person, they might behave better than they otherwise would. Permitting the tolerationist to 
spread doubt looks like a bad bet, if we care deeply about the salvation of our fellow men, even 
if the tolerationist is right. And of course all we are conceding is that there is some chance that 
the tolerationist is right, not that there is anything like an equal chance of his being right. What 
does Christian love require if we follow this line of reasoning? 
 
What should we think of Castellio? I think it's understandable that Castellio did not achieve a 
place in the philosophical canon. When his arguments are not appeals to nonscriptural authorities 
or ad hominem, they are heavily theological, in the sense that they rely on the Christian 
scripturesŠ as an authoritative text. Since Descartes philosophers have generally tried to rely 
only on arguments which do not require acceptance of any particular text as sacred. In view of 
the critique to which the Jewish and Christian scriptures are liable - and which the Hebrew Bible 
received from Spinoza in the Theological-Political Treatise - this seems a good policy, even if it 
is not, as some would argue, a necessary condition for civic virtue in a pluralistic society. 
 
The problem is not just that not everyone accepts these scriptures as sacred - though that may be 
problem enough - but that the scriptures Christians accept as sacred are open to selective 
quotation in support of a variety of positions on many issues, and that the selection seems to be 
guided by ethical views which the parties bring to their use of scripture, and cannot simply 
derive from those scriptures. Castellio correctly accuses his opponents of selective quotation. But 
he is equally guilty of it.31 The appeals to scripture occupy a great deal of space on both sides, 
but they do not seem to be doing that much actual work. 
 
If we look in Castellio for something which transcends the appeal to scripture, what we find 
often involves an appeal to skepticism. Earlier I said that Castellio's skepticism might seem fairly 
radical. But by comparison with Montaigne's skepticism, it's crude and modest. It is crude in that 
it argues for skepticism simply on the principle that persistent disagreements indicate objective 
uncertainty, without deploying the full range of skeptical arguments Montaigne learned from the 
classical skeptics. And it is modest in two important respects: it extends only to certain 
theological propositions, not to all theological propositions, and not to ethical beliefs at all - 
though the principle on which it is based would seem to justify those extensions. Moreover, it 
claims only some uncertainty, not the radical uncertainty of Montaigne's pyrrhonism, which 
holds that no disputed proposition is more probable than its opposite. 
 
This poses something of a dilemma. The moderate skepticism of Castellio may be insufficient to 
justify toleration. The more radical skepticism of Montaigne may make toleration seem more 
reasonable, but at the price of what looks like a substantive attack on Christianity. It seems that it 
would be highly desirable to have available an argument for toleration which did not require 
Christians to accept a skepticism as radical as that. They might very reasonably regard accepting 
such a skepticism as tantamount to abandoning their religion. 
 
There may be a way out of this dilemma. One thing which emerges from these reflections is that 
the Christian belief in heaven and hell, i.e., in eternal reward and eternal punishment, does raise 
the stakes enormously, making it seem quite rational to punish heresy if there is any significant 
probability that the beliefs in question may be required for salvation. In the early modern period 
the belief in hell declined quite remarkably, for reasons which D. P. Walker has analyzed.32 In a 
context in which there is substantial, widespread doubt about the doctrine of eternal punishment, 
it may be easier to mount an argument for toleration based on skepticism without having to go so 
far as Montaigne did. The decline of the belief in hell may have been, historically, a more 
significant factor in the acceptance of toleration than has been realized. 
 
Still, this way out is not an easy one. In view of the strong support in the New Testament for the 
doctrine of hell, skepticism about that doctrine does require adopting a critical attitude toward 
the sacred texts and the authority of Jesus. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The next stage in my investigation of the post-Reformation debates about toleration takes me to 
Montaigne. There is not space here to develop what I have to say about Montaigne in any kind of 
detail, but I would like to indicate the general line I take. 
 
Richard Sayce, in the best book I have so far found on Montaigne,31 claims that his most 
positive contribution to religious thought was his advocacy of toleration. 33 Acknowledging that 
Montaigne had precursors like Castellio, he nevertheless contends that Montaigne "may well 
have been the most influential up to that date." 34 
 
I think this may be true, and that if it is true, it's a surprising truth, an oddity, at least, if you think 
of Montaigne in the way much writing on Montaigne encourages us to.35 I suppose there is 
some natural tendency of skepticism to lead to toleration. One might apply here a remark 
Montaigne made in connection with the punishment of witches: "To kill people, there must be a 
sharp and brilliant clarity."36 But merely resisting the execution of heretics is not going very far 
towards toleration. 
 
Moreover, Montaigne does combine his skepticism with views which seem not so friendly to 
religious toleration. In the "Apology for Raymond Sebond" and in other essays, he adopts a form 
of fideism: 
 
We can only grasp that Truth [i.e., the truth of the Christian religion] and lodge it within us if 
God favours us with the privilege of further help, beyond the natural order. I do not believe that 
purely human means have the capacity to do this... Only faith can embrace, with a lively 
certainty, the high mysteries of our religion. (CE, 492) 
 
With this fideism comes a very conservative approach in religion: 
By God's grace, without worry or a troubled conscience, I have kept myself whole, within the 
ancient beliefs of our religion, through all the sects and schisms our century has produced. (CE, 
642) 
 
This is an application to religion of the classic pyrrhonian solution to the problem of how one 
should live when everything is uncertain: "The most convincing advice we get from reason is 
that each and every man should obey the laws of his own country."37 
 
Sometimes Montaigne presents the appearance of an extreme conservativism. E.g., in the essay 
"That it is madness to judge the true and the false from our own capacities" he argues that "we 
must either totally submit to the authority of our ecclesiastical polity or else totally release 
ourselves from it." (CE, 204) If we assume that the latter is not a real option, we get a Montaigne 
who is ultra-orthodox. 
 
If Montaigne's version of skepticism calls for him to obey the laws of his country, and to submit 
totally to the authority of the Church established in his country, and if that Church is one which 
believes that heresy, and unbelief generally, are not to be tolerated, then toleration will not be a 
consequence of skepticism. Since both these conditions seem to be satisfied, it is at least a little 
surprising that Montaigne should have acquired a reputation for tolerance, and indeed, perhaps 
be a major figure in the development of arguments in favor of toleration. 
 
Nevertheless, Sayce entitles his chapter on Montaigne's political philosophy "The Conservative 
and the Revolutionary" and there is a good deal in Montaigne which is genuinely revolutionary 
in the historical context in which he is operating. Not only does he disapprove killing witches, he 
seems not to think they should be punished at all. It is beyond our power to tell who is truly a 
witch. Even where there is an apparently voluntary confession of witchcraft, it is more 
reasonable to suppose that the witch is crazy than that she genuinely has supernatural powers. 
(CE, 1166-69) 
 
With this skepticism about witchcraft goes an attitude toward miracles which anticipates the 
critiques of Spinoza and Hume (CE, 111-12, 126 1162-64), a moving condemnation of the 
attempts of the Portuguese to forcibly convert the Jews (CE, 55-56), biting criticism of the 
Spanish treatment of native populations in the New World (CE, 1032-33), and a rejection of the 
use of torture, either as a punishment or as a tool of investigation (CE, 414). 
When the question of Montaigne's religious orthodoxy comes up, it is often pointed out that the 
Vatican censor approved the Essays in the year after their publication. He did object to some 
passages, such as the one in the essay "On cruelty," which holds that any punishment beyond 
simple death is cruelty (CE, 482), or the generally favorable treatment of Julian the Apostate in 
the essay "On the liberty of conscience" (CE, 759-63). But he did not insist that Montaigne alter 
these passages, leaving any changes to his discretion. For the most part Montaigne did not 
change the passages the censor complained of, and in the essay "On restraining your will" this 
advocate of total submission to authority denied that the censor was right to condemn his book 
for containing one of the passages he retained (which praised the reformer Beza for the beauty of 
his erotic poetry).38 
 
Within a hundred years of their first publication the Essays had been placed on the Index of 
Prohibited Books. In my view that represents a more reasonable judgment of Montaigne's work 
from a Catholic perspective. Sayce points out that the censor who approved the book in 1581 did 
not read French, and relied on a French friar to give him an account of it. "It is a mistake," he 
observes, "to think that censors are always efficient." (p. 206) 
 
There is a major division among Montaigne scholars between those who think Montaigne is 
sincere when he professes adherence to Catholic Christianity39 and those who think something 
more devious and interesting is going on.40 I lean toward the latter view. 
 
In a sense, though, it does not matter what Montaigne believed in his heart, if we are interested 
mainly in his influence. For then the question will be: what subversive ideas might a receptive 
reader pick up from the Essays? If that's the question, it has many possible answers, of which 
one, which itself has the form of a question, will have to suffice: 
 
Could that ancient god have more clearly emphasized the place of ignorance within our human 
knowledge of the divine Being, or taught us that religion is really no more than a human 
invention, useful for binding societies together, than by telling those who came before his Tripod 
to beg for instruction that the true way of worship is the one hallowed by custom in each 
locality? (CE, 653) 
 
To say that "the true way of worship" varies from one locality to another is to say, I think, that 
there is no true way of worship in the way that phrase would normally be understood. If 
Montaigne owes his influence on the subsequent debate about toleration to this kind of thought, 
then his contribution is an attack on the truth claims of all religion. This might not be an 
argumentative strategy which would commend itself to a modern liberal. 
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